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COMMENT
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN WISCONSIN
The joint bank account has become a popular form of holding
and transferring property. The joint account's popularity is grounded
largely in the fact that it allows funds remaining on deposit at the death
of a codepositorl to pass to the surviving codepositor without the
necessity of a will and the burdens of probate. In addition to survivor-
ship rights, the joint bank account may carry with it present ownership
rights. However, the determination of lifetime rights and survivorship
rights in joint accounts has been the source of considerable litigation.
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the rights of codepositors
in a joint account, to point out some of the problems that exist today,
and to discuss possible alternatives to the present Wisconsin law.
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS UNDER PRESENT WISCONSIN LAW
Survivorship Rights
Prior to 1935 the Wisconsin Supreme Court used the law of gifts
to determine whether a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship
had been created in a joint bank account. In Marshall & isley Bank v.
Voigt,2 the right of survivorship was denied to the surviving codepositor
of a joint savings account because, prior to the death of the donor de-
positor, there had never been a delivery of the passbook to the donee
depositor and consequently there was no completed gift of the deposit
to the donee. Then, in Estate of Stayer,3 decided in 1935, the court
departed from its previous rulings which had applied the law of gifts
and adopted the contract theory.
Stayer involved certificates of deposit which were payable "to the
order of Joseph Stayer or Frank J. Stayer." Joseph Stayer was the
original owner of the certificates and from the facts it appeared that
Frank never had possession or any physical control over the certificates
prior to Joseph's death. The court, recognizing that the transaction
failed to meet the requirements of a trust or gift, concluded that the
question was not one of transfer but rather one of contract. The court
said:
In case of joint bank accounts evidenced by certificates of de-
posit, the chose in action or contract claimed against the bank is
at the outset created not only in the depositor but in the person
whom he designates as joint payee or owner of the deposit.4
The contract doctrine espoused in Stayer has become firmly established
in Wisconsin. It has been applied by the court to savings bank ac-
I Codepositor refers to a person named in the deposit agreement and does not
necessarily mean that he has made a deposit in the account.
2 214 Wis. 27, 252 N.W. 355 (1934).
3 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).
- Id. at 119-20, 260 N.W. at 658.
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counts,5 has been sustained against constitutional attack, and has been
cited with approval in almost all cases involving joint bank accounts.
One problem; however, in the application of the contract theory
is the variance in the forms used by banks to create joint accounts.
The usual form is signed by both codepositors and declares joint own-
ership with rights of withdrawal and survivorship.7 However, in some
instances the names merely appear jointly on an account or passbook.
In Estate of Skilling, a passbook to a savings account and the bank
records read "Edward or John M. Skilling" and there was a rubber
stamp notation that "the money herein deposited is owned jointly by
the persons named and is subject to the order of either, the balance at
the death of either to belong to the survivor."9 Another form uses the
phrase "as joint tenants" after the printed names of the parties on the
deposit contract. Regardless of the variations present in the forms,
however, it appears that any language which implies that the account
is payable to either or the survivor is sufficient to give the donee de-
positor survivorship rights.
Another problem arising both from the language of some deposit
contracts and from the language of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is
whether the survivor takes the account because the parties were joint
tenants or simply because the contract created a survivorship interest.
The resolution of this issue could affect the tax liability of the parties
as well as the lifetime rights of the parties to the account. In Stayer,
where the court stressed the contractual rights of the donee beneficiary,
the court spoke of "joint owners"' 0 and said that "the legal title to the
chose in action is in the depositor and the other joint payee jointly.","
No definite answer is given in the cases arising afterStaver although it
does appear that the contract may create a joint tenancy and, when
this occurs, survivorship rights are protected either under the principle
of third party beneficiary or the rules of joint tenancy.12
The provisions of Wisconsin Statute Section 221.45 have been used
by the court to effectuate the terms of deposit contracts, especially the
survivorship term. The statute provides:
5 Estate of Skilling, 218 Wis. 574, 260 N.W. 660 (1935).
6 Schwanke v. Garlt, 219 Wis. 367, 263 N.W. 176 (1935).
7 Comment, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 306 (1954). The author states that many banks
use the contract form approved by the American Banker's Association. 37
\IARQ. L. REv. at 307.
8 Note 5 supra.
9 218 Wis. at 576, 260 N.W. at 661.
10 218 Wis. at 119, 260 N.W. at 658.
"1218 Wis. at 121, 260 N.W. at 658.
12 See Estate of Pfiefer, 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W.2d 370 (1957), where the form
of the account is said to raise a presumption that the creator intended the
usual rights incident to jointly owned property. Compare Stayer and its dis-
cussion of contract law.
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When a deposit has been made or shall hereafter be made, in
any bank, trust company bank, or mutual savings bank trans-
acting business in this state in the names of 2 persons, payable
to either, or payable to either or the survivor, such deposit, or
any part thereof, or any interest or dividend thereon, may be
paid to either of said persons whether the other be living or not;
and the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a
valid and sufficient release and discharge to the bank for any
payment so made.
In Stayer the court stated that: "Our banking statute, Sec. 221.45,
recognizes the right of survivorship where the certificate of deposit is
in the names of two persons, payable to either or the survivor. ' 13 In
Boehmer v. Boehmer,14 the court said: "Sec. 221.45 Stat. specifically
provides that a joint tenancy is created . . ."15 and held that in Stayer
the court had construed the statute as giving the right of survivorship
to either payee.' 6 Since Boehrner, however, the court has stated that
Wisconsin Statute Section 221.45 was enacted simply for the protection
of banks and does not determine the rights of the named payees of a
joint bank account as between themselves.17
Renewed importance was given to Section 221.45 in Estate of
Michaels s where the court said that the statute may be pertinent on
the issue of whether the atterihpted conferral of survivorship rights on
the surviving donee is an ineffective testamentary disposition. The court
held that conferral of survivorship rights at the death of the depositor
was valid under Section 221.45.
It is this statute which implements the deposit contract and
causes legal title to vest in the survivor payee even though
equity in a proper case may intervene to impress a trust against
such survivor payee. The passing of legal title is irreconcilable
with the concept that such an attempted transfer is an ineffective
testamentary disposition because of failure to comply with the
requirements of the Statute of Wills.'"
The court held in Stayer that the
legal ownership of instruments and the incidents of such owner-
ship should generally depend upon their terms, leaving it to a
court of equity to impose on the holder of the legal title such
equitable obligations as the law of trusts warrants. 20
Two circumstances which would warrant the imposition of a trust upon
the title of the survivor are: first, where it is shown that the purpose
13 218 Wis. at 124, 260 N.W. at 660.
1 264 Wis. 15, 58 NA.2d 411 (1953).15 Id. at 19, 58 N.W.2d at 413.
16 Id. at 20, 58 N.W.2d at 413.
'7 Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d 767 (1955) ; Estate of Kemmerer,
16 Wis. 2d 480, 114 N.W.2d 803 (1962).Is26 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 557 (1965).
19 Id. at 397-8, 132 N.W.2d at 565.
20 Estate of Stayer, 218 Wis. 114, 124; 260 N.W. 655, 659 (1935).
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of the deposit was to constitute the payee, other than the depositor, a
mere agent ;21 and, second, where the donee payee by an express agree-
ment with the depositor promised to distribute the funds as the de-
positor desired.2 The court made it clear, however, that even in these
circumstances, the legal title is in the survivor and it would be necessary
to show by clear and satisfactory evidence a duty upon the survivor to
hold the title in trust for another.23 In Estate of Michaes,2 -4 the court
stated that a logical and natural development of the theory espoused
in Stayer would be to hold that a rebuttable presumption exists that the
donor depositor intended the right of survivorship, which presumption
could be rebutted only by clear and satisfactory evidence35 The re-
buttable presumption discussed in dicta in Michaels was fully recog-
nized in Estate of Pfeifer,26 where the court said:
Although the form of the account is not conclusive, as we said
in the cases supra, an account opened in joint names raises a
rebuttable presumption that the creator of such an account in-
tended the usual rights incident to jointly owned property, such
as rights of survivorship, to attach to it. Evidence showing a
different intent, for instance that the joint names were adopted
for convenience without the intent of conferring ownership, may
serve to prove agency or trusteeship in the third party in respect
to the account but in the absence of such evidence, which must
be clear and satisfactory, the presumption that the depositor in-
tended the usual incidents of jointly held property when he
opened a joint account is sufficient to support a finding to that
effect.2
7
Lifetime Rights
The general rule that "an account opened in joint names raises a
rebuttable presumption that the creator of such an account intended
the usual rights incident to jointly owned property"2 s was applied to
determine the lifetime rights of co-depositors in Estate of Gray.29 In
the more recent case of Estate of Kohn,"° the court stated that "in a
true joint tenancy, each tenant has an interest to a proportionate part
but the power to deal with the whole." 31 However, there are joint ac-
21 Id. at 121, 260 N.W. at 658.
22 Id. at 122, 260 N.W. at 658.
22 Ibid.
2426 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 561 (1965).
25 Id. at 390, 132 N.W.2d at 561.
26 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
27 Id at 612-3, 85 N.W.2d at 372. Also cited in Estate of Kemmerer, 16 Wis. 2d
480, 488-9, 114 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1962) ; Estate of Roth, 25 Wis. 2d 528, 533,
131 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1964) ; Estate of 'Michaels, 26 Wis. 2d 382, 390-1, 132
N.W.2d 557, 561 (1965).
28 Estate of Pfeifer, 1 Wis. 2d 609, 612-3, 85 N.W.2d 370, 372 (1957).
29 27 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965).
O 43 Wis. 2d 520, 168 N.W.2d 812 (1969).
31 Id. at 525, 168 N.W.2d at 815. Either named party acting alone could with-
draw the entire amount pursuant to terms of the deposit agreement. The party
who withdraws more than his proportionate share is under a duty to restore
the interest of the other party.
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counts which are not intended to create a joint tenancy. The account
of convenience where one party is merely an agent of the other has
already been mentioned as an alternative to the true joint tenancy.32 In
Kohn the court recognized as another alternative those "arrangements
which only intend a right of survivorship and no present right. ' 33 When
either of these alternatives is found to exist, the court will have deter-
mined that the donor depositor did not intend to give half of the amount
deposited to the other party named on the deposit contract.
The fundamental question is one of intent. In Kohn the court said:
[I]n Kelberger v. First Federal Savings & Loan Asso. (1955),
270 Wis. 434, 71 N.W.2d 257, we definitely established that the
nature of a joint deposit depended primarily upon the intention
of the depositor and this was a question of fact. Consequently,
the intention of the depositor to create or not to create a joint
tenancy in a bank account or the intention of the parties, gen-
erally husband and wife if they both participate in the creation
of the account, is a controlling factor and the form of the bank
account is not determinative of its nature.34
However, the court went on to say:
[T]he form of the savings account is prima facie evidence of
what it purports to be and the evidence to overcome it must be
clear and convincing.
3 5
These two statements frame the problem involved in determining
inter vivos rights in a joint account. In the first quote, the court made
it clear that the intention of the depositor controls the nature of the joint
deposit. However, as indicated by the second statement, the court starts
its inquiry with a rebuttable presumption that the depositor's intention
conforms to the language of the deposit contract.
In Wisconsin there have been six cases in which lifetime rights of
the parties to a joint account were in issue. 36 One of the cases, Zander
v. Holly,37 stands out because, in deciding it, the court did not mention
the existence of the presumption regarding the incidents of joint ten-
ancy. In Zander the court stated, "We have been unable to find any
cases decided by this court in which the rights of two named depositors
during the lifetime of each were determined."3 8 After considering many
32 Estate of Staver, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935) ; Plainse v. Engle, 262
Wis. 506,56 N.W.2d 89 (1952).
33 43 VWis. 2d at 525, 168 N.W.2d at 815. This type of account was found to exist
and given effect in Michaels, note 24 supra.
3443 Wis. 2d at 524, 168 N.W.2d at 815.
3 Ibid.
36 Estate of Schley, 271 VWis. 74, 72 N.W.2d 767 (1955) ; Boehmer v. Boehmer,
264 Wis. 15, 58 N.W.2d 411 (1953) ; Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d
87 (1957) ; Estate of Roth, 25 Wis. 2d 528, 131 N.W.2d 286 (1964) ; Estate of
Gray, 27 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965); Estate of Kohn, 43 Wis. 2d
520, 168 N.W.2d 812 (1969).
37 1Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957).
38 Id. at 308, 84 N.W.2d at 92. Two previous cases, Boehmer v. Boehmer, 264
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cases from other jurisdictions, the rule followed by New York and
Michigan was adopted. The rule in those states is based upon the
opinion written by Judge Cardozo in M11askowitz v. Morrow,39 where
he stated that the "realities of ownership" test is to be applied to deter-
mine lifetime rights and that the form of the account does not create
a conclusive presumption of proportionate ownership.40 Having adopted
the "realities of ownershsip" test, the Wisconsin court held that:
In determining the validity of any gift of an interest in a bank
account, the first element to be determined is an intention on the
part of the donor to give.41
It would seem that if Zander were the only case in which the Wis-
consin court had dealt with lifetime rights accompanying a joint bank
account, an argument could be made that the intentiton of the parties
should be decided without the application of the presumption. Despite
the failure to apply the presumption in Zander, however, the Wisconsin
position seems fairly well settled that an intention to confer both sur-
vivorship rights and present ownership rights will be presumed when
parties use a joint bank account.4
Rebutting the Presumption of Joint Tenancy
The presumption of a true joint tenancy is rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence. The strength of the presumption in Wisconsin
can best be understood by considering evidence which the court has
held to be clear and convincing. Generally it can be said that the court
views all the evidence and that a combination of many facts may have
a cumulative effect that rebuts the presumption. Nonetheless, there do
appear to be several key factors that the court looks for and, absent
these, the presumption will prevail.
Before considering the specific cases where an attempt was made
to rebut the presumption of joint tenancy arising from the deposit agree-
ment, it should be remembered that the decision in Estate of 111ichaels
recognizes joint accounts where the donee depositor has only survivor-
ship rights. Consequently, in a lifetime dispute between the original
depositor and the co-named party, the original depositor would have
the opportunity to show that he intended only survivorship rights with-
out relinquishing control during his lifetime over the funds deposited.
Also, where an account of convenience exists, i.e., where the creator of
the account intended the other party to be a mere agent, the agent-
codepositor has neither absolute survivorship rights nor present owner-
ship rights. Thus, the creator of a joint account can argue the existence
Wis. 15, 58 N.W.2d 411 (1953) and Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d
767 (1955) apparently were not brought to the Court's attention.
39 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, (1929).
40 Id. at 399, 167 N.E. at 511.
41 1 Wis. 2d at 311, 84 N.VWF.2d at 93.
42 See note 28 supra.
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of an account of convenience when lifetime rights are involved. In a
survivorship case, the account of convenience argument is the only
one available to defeat the rights of the surviving codepositor.
In Plainse v. Engle,43 an action was brought by the guardian of the
donor depositor of a joint savings account against the donor's daughter,
who was named as joint payee. The daughter had withdrawn funds
from the joint bank account immediately prior to an adjudication of
her father's incompetency. The evidence which was held sufficient to
establish an agency was testimony by the daughter that "he just had
my name put on there in case he got ill or anything."' 4 Testimony by
the donee depositor that the donor depositor's intention was to create
an agency seems to be the strongest evidence available and is certainly
clear and convincing. A case involving testimony by both parties to
the agreement that an agency was intended was Zander v. Holly45 where
the defendant donee had testified at an adverse examination that she
did not claim to have the right to make withdrawals without the donor
depositor's instructions. In Zander there was also evidence that the
donor depositor, an aunt of the donee who was seeking to reclaim full
ownership of the account, was advanced in years and of feeble health.
In Estate of Pfeifer,46 a case involving survivorship rights rather
than lifetime rights, the court stressed the importance of evidence of
the parties' intent at the time of creation of the account. The court held
nct to be clear and convincing evidence the fact that the existence of
the account had been concealed from the co-owner and that, once the
existence of the account was revealed, its use was limited to payment
of the donor's bills. Special mention was made of the lack of testimony
of word or condition contemporaneous with the creation of the account.
Statements to the bank officials at the time the account is opened may
be quite significant.
Concealment of the existence of the account by the original depositor
has been held to be a neutral circumstance and to fall short of rebutting
the presumption of survivorship." However, in Estate of Gray,48 it
appears that such evidence would have been sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of present ownership rights of the unknowing codepositor. In
Gray the trial court found that the donor did not intend to create a true
joint tenancy but only the right of survivorship. The supreme court
reversed and relied on the fact that there was "no evidence from which
it could be concluded that Otto Gray was barred from making with-
drawals or from fully enjoying the account as a joint tenant." Stated
affirmatively, the court will find the intent to create present ownership
43262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W.2d 89 (1952).
44 Id. at 516, 56 N.W.2d at 94.
45 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W.2d 87 (1957).
46 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
'4 Estate of Michaels, 26 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 557 (1964).
4827 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965).
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in the donee whenever the donee is able to make withdrawals. The
donee can be prevented from making withdrawals only by concealment
of the existence of a checking account or by retention of the passbook
to a savings account.4"
EVALUATION OF PRESENT LAW
The joint bank account is a unique form of ownership and it is
inappropriate to characterize it as a joint tenancy. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Estate of Michaels5" recognized the difficulties in
classifying a joint bank account under traditional property concepts.
The court ended its opinion with this statement:
The joint bank account is a comparatively new device in the
long development of the law. While the joint payees of such
account are termed joint tenants for lack of better terminology,
the account has different attributes than a true joint tenancy.
Such an account provides a useful technique for transferring
property, and need not fit any of the historical and traditional
property concepts associated with the law of inter vivos gifts
and joint tenancy. It would be a mistake to ignore the deposit
contract and the intent of the parties in order to apply such
concepts.5'
Professor Richard W. Effland has suggested the need for a re-evalu-
ation of the law governing joint bank accounts.
Where survivorship rights are dependent upon contract rather
than property notions of joint tenancy, traditional notions of
joint tenancy should be inapplicable, and rights during lifetime
as well as survivorship at death should be determined by the
intent of the parties as expressed in terms of the contract inter-
preted in the light of all relevant circumstances. =
The law governing the relationship of codepositors should reflect
the intent of the person or persons who created the joint bank account.
Wisconsin cases continually have held that the nature of a joint deposit
depends primarily upon the intention of the depositor.53 At the same
time, however, it is held that the form of the account raises a presump-
tion that a joint tenancy was intended. The crucial question is whether
this presumption is grounded in reality.
The survivorship feature of a joint bank account was given effect
in the Michaels case despite the lack of any interest in the surviv-
49 Clear and convincing evidence was found to exist in Estate of Roth, 25 Wis.
2d 528, 131 N..2d 826 (1964), but the circumstances were very unusual. Mr.
Roth was in the hospital having two discs removed from his spine. Just prior
to the operation he signed a signature card for a new savings account which
added his stepson's name to the account. According to Mr. Roth, he did not
read the card because he was in pain and he testified that there were no
other signatures on the card when he signed it.5026 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.VWA.2d 557 (1965).
51 Id. at 398, 132 N.W.2d at 565.
52 Effland, Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 507, 514.
53 Estate of Kohn, 43 Wis. 2d 520, 168 N.W.2d. 812 (1969).
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ing codepositor during the lifetime of the deceased creator of the ac-
count. The desire of the courts to protect survivorship rights is probably
one of the chief reasons joint tenancy concepts were applied to joint
bank accounts. It would seem, however, that contract principles would
be sufficient to establish survivorship rights. Now that survivorship
rights can exist independent of a present interest, there is less reason
to categorize a joint account as a true joint tenancy since the necessity
to presume all the incidents of a joint tenancy no longer exists. The
presumption of survivorship should remain if it is clear that parties by
using a joint account intend that the survivor have absolute title to
the remaining balance at the death of either party. The joint bank ac-
count has been termed a "poor man's will"54 and there is little doubt
that survivorship is the predominant feature of this popular way of
holding property.
The other incident of joint tenancy, proportionate lifetime rights,
should be treated separately from survivorship and the correctness of
the presumption as to it should be tested independently. Since the inten-
tion of the parties is the controlling factor, it is proper to ask whether,
when one party to a joint account makes a deposit, he usually intends
to make a gift of one-half the amount. It is submitted that most people
do not intend to make an irrevocable gift and that the presumption
of a gift works against the intent of the parties.5
If the presumption of proportionate ownership is not grounded in
reality, what steps should be taken to improve the law in this area? One
solution would be to reverse the present presumption so that it follows
and supports the intention of the parties. A depositor then would be
presumed not to intend to relinquish control over one-half or other
fraction of his deposit. The Uniform Probate Code has come to grips
with the problem of lifetime rights of codepositors and its solution is
found in Article Six.
ARTICLE SIX OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Part One of Article Six of the Uniform Probate Code deals with
multi-party accounts, i.e., accounts in financial institutions involving
two or more named parties. A multiple party account includes the
following types of accounts: (1) joint accounts, (2) payable-on-death
or P.O.D. accounts, and (3) trust accounts.56 The stated purpose of
Part One is to strengthen popular arrangements involving various de-
posit accounts by which funds may be transmitted from one person to
54 Estate of Nlichaels, 26 Wis. 2d 382, 394, 132 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1965).
55 Wellman, Joint and Survivor Accounts, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 629 (1965). After
suggesting that an account that combines the aspects of a "trust and will"
should be adopted in 'Michigan, the author states at p. 675: "There seems to
be no reason for presuming that a joint account created by the deposit of one
person is intended to be a present to another. If a gift is intended, there is no
reason for the joint account form."
56 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE Sec. 6-10(e).
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another upon death. Article Six, by establishing uniform rules regarding
the form of survivorship accounts, and by avoiding theories of joint
tenancy or tenancy in common in regard to rights of living codepos-
itors, would seem to accomplish its purpose.
Financial institutions are fully protected when payment is made in
accordance with the deposit contract. The provisions of Sections 6-108
to 6-113 govern the liability of financial institutions and their set-off
rights. Those provisions are independent of Sections 6-103 to 6-105
which bear on the rights of depositors as among themselves.5 7 Section
6-102 is important because it organizes the sections into those dealing
with the relationship between the parties to multiple party accounts on
the one hand, and those relating to the financial institution-depositor
relationship on the other. By keeping these relationships separate, Arti-
cle Six seeks to achieve the degree of definiteness desired by financial
institutions, while preserving the opportunity for individuals involved
in the accounts to show various intentions that may have attended the
original deposit or any unusual transactions affecting the account
thereafter.
The joint account is defined as an account payable to one or more
of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right of
survivorship. 58 "Party" means a person who, by the terms of the ac-
count, has a present right, subject to request, to payment from a multi-
ple-party account.59 The discussion of the provisions of Article Six
concerned with the relationship of the parties will be limited to the
joint account and will not apply to other multiple party accounts such
as the P.O.D. and the trust account. Under the provisions of Article
Six, the joint account is not treated as a joint tenancy. There is no
presumption that the parties enjoy proportionate ownership. Section
6-103 (a) provides:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the
parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums
on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intent.
In the official comment to Section 6-103, it is stated that the rule
reflects the assumption that a person who deposits funds in a multiple
party account normally does not intend to make an irrevocable gift of
all or any part of the funds represented by the deposit. Rather, he usu-
ally intends no present change of beneficial ownership. Section 6-103
requires clear and convincing evidence to show a different intent on the
part of the depositor and in effect a presumption is created. The pre-
sumed fact under Sectiton 6-103 is the exact opposite of that presumed
presently in Wisconsin case law.
57 Sec. 6-102.
58 Sec. 6-101(d).
59 Sec. 6-101 (g).
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The most important and difficult concept inSection 6-103 is that of
"net contributions." Ownership during the lifetime of the parties is in
proportion to their "net contributions." What are "net contributions"
and how are they determined? They are defined as
the sum of all deposits made by or for him [the depositor], less
withdrawals made by or for him which have not been paid or
applied to the use of any other party, plus a pro rata share of
any interest or dividends included in the current balance.60
Many practical problems can be foreseen when it becomes necessary
to determine the exact net contribution of each party. When a checking
account is involved, deposits and withdrawals are so frequent that it
may be a formidable task to go back in time and to allocate them be-
tween the parties. Of course, the cancelled checks and returned deposit
slips may be available to start the allocation. If a savings account is
involved usually the only record of deposits and withdrawals retained
is the passbook which does not indicate which party conducted the
transaction. Assuming the parties could identify their deposits and
withdrawals, it must still be determined if any were made for another
party or applied to the use of any other party. If a husband and wife
were the parties, questions would arise concerning the husband's duty
of support. The wife apparently would not reduce her net contribution
by the withdrawal of funds for household and necessary personal ex-
penses, but if she purchased a personal luxury or a present for her
mother, the withdrawal would affect her equity in the account.
There is no provision dealing with division of an account when the
parties fail to prove net contributions. Considering the difficulties of
establishing net contributions, it is likely that the failure of proof will
be frequent. In the Third and Fourth Working Drafts of the Uniform
Probate Code the failure-of-proof problem was handled by presuming
the parties own the account in equal undivided interests 6' and, thus,
the parties occupied the position of tenants in common. One reason
given for deleting the provision was that the statement dealing with
failure to prove net contribution undesirably narrowed the possibility
of proof of partial contributions. It would seem that the situations
where net contributions are wholly incapable of being shown will exist
and the problem must be faced. Proof of partial contributions could
be retained and even expressly provided for, but when there is no proof
as to the whole account or even part of it, the consequences should be
stated clearly.
Michigan has adopted the position of Section 6-103 to regulate
credit union demand accounts.62 However, Michigan has also provided
60 Sec. 6-101 (f).
61 UNIFOR-M PROBATE CODE Sec. 6-104 (Third Working Draft).
62 Mich. Stat. Sec. 490.53. Presumptions; demand accounts ownership in propor-
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that there should be a presumption of ownership in equal undivided
interests when there is an absence of satisfactory proof of the net con-
tributions. 63
The concept of net contributions would seem to permit the parties
to a joint account to be as definite, or as indefinite, as they wish with
respect to the matter of how beneficial ownership should be appor-
tioned between them. This latitude may give full effect to the intention
of the parties but, in cases of dispute between the parties over owner-
ship, previously desirable indefiniteness may result in failure of proof
by both parties as to their net contributions. Some guidelines are surely
needed when indefiniteness exists or the concept of net contributions
may prove unsatisfactory.
Section 6-103 does not undertake to describe the situation between
parties if one withdraws more than he is then entitled to as against the
other party. In the Comment to Section 6-103 it is stated that presum-
ably overwithdrawal leaves the party making the excessive withdrawal
liable to the beneficial owner as a debtor or trustee. However, evidence
of intention by one to make a gift to the other of any sums withdrawn
by the other in excess of his ownership should be effective. Clear and
convincing evidence of a gift may be required for it would seem con-
sistent to continue the presumption against a gift during the existence
of the account.
It is important to note that Section 6-103 is limited to ownership
rights of an account while the original parties are alive. Section 6-104
prescribes what happens to beneficial ownership on the death of a party
and provides:
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint
account belong to the surviving party or parties against the estate
of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
different intention at the time the account is created.
The presumption of survivorship rights is retained and is based
upon the presumption that most persons who use joint accounts want
the survivor or survivors to have all balances remaining at death.
ARTICLE SIX COMPARED TO THE WISCONSIN POSITION
Article Six does not treat a joint account as a present joint tenancy
but rather recognizes that a joint account is a unique way of holding
tion to net contributions.
(3) During the lifetime of all parties, a multiple party account which pro-
vides that sums on deposit or in shares may be paid on the demand of either
of 2 or more parties is presumed to belong to the parties in proportion to
the net contributions by each of the sums on deposit.
63 Mich. Stat. Sec. 490.54. Presumptions; ownership in equal undivided interests.
(4) In the absence of satisfactory proof of the net contributions, those
who are parties from time to time shall be presumed to own a multiple ac-
count in equal undivided interests.
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and transferring property. During the lives of the parties, each retains
ownership rights over his net contributions and at the death of a party
the account operates as a valid disposition. In Wisconsin, the joint
bank account is treated as a true joint tenancy and upon deposit a party
is considered as having given up ownership rights in part of the amount
deposited. The validity of the Wisconsin position on lifetime rights
turns upon the validity of the assumption that most people who deposit
funds in a joint account intend to make a gift of all or part of the fund.
If this assumption is not grounded in reality, the present rule is con-
trary to the intention of the parties and Article Six appears to provide
the framework for fashioning a satisfactory alternative.
Survivorship rights are treated the same under Article Six as they
are under the present Wisconsin law. Both presume that survivorship
was intended by the depositor and under both views only clear and con-
vincing evidence will rebut the presumption. It is not improbable that
the same evidence which has been held sufficient to show a contrary
intention in Wisconsin would also be sufficient under Article Six.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The tax consequences of a joint bank account cannot be definitely
established at the time the account is created. Under present law the
donor depositor may have to pay an inheritance tax on half of the de-
posit if the donee predeceases him. On the other hand, there is presently
a tax loophole available when incorporating a joint bank account into
an estate plan.6 4 In general, the adoption of Article Six of the Uniform
Probate Code would clarify the rights of the various parties to a joint
bank account and may point up a need for some corresponding changes
in the various tax laws.
In Department of Taxation v. Berry,65 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that, since a deposit into a joint account is revocable at the
will of the donor depositor, no gift tax arises upon deposit. The court
relied on Wisconsin Statute Section 72.76 which provides:
A gift shall be complete for tax purposes when the donor has
divested himself of all beneficial interest in the property trans-
ferred and has no power to revest any such interest in himself
or his estate.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the rule in Berry is incon-
sistent with the court's position on rights of living codepositors.6 6 Berry
64 Note, Taxation-Inheritance and Gift Taxes on Joint Bank Accounts, 1961
Wis. L. Rzv. 150, 151. An example of the tax loophole is the spousal donor-
donee situation. When the donor deposits a sum in the account there is no
gift tax imposed and under the inheritance tax statute only half of the sum
shall be deemed a transfer.
65 258 Wis. 544,46 N.W.2d 757 (1951).
GG Estate of Simonson, 11 Wis. 2d 84, 90, 104 N.VW.2d 134, 137 (1960).
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is also inconsistent with Estate of Schley 7 which held that interests in
joint bank accounts are presumed equal regardless of the fact that the
deposit agreement allows either party to withdraw the entire fund. A
gift tax liability would appear to arise each time a party to a joint ac-
count withdraws a sum which exceeds his contributions because at that
time, under the rule in Berry and Wisconsin Statutes Section 72.76, a
gift has been perfected to the extent of the excess of the amount with-
drawn over the withdrawing party's contributions.
The adoption of Uniform Probate Code Section 6-103 would con-
form the law governing rights of living codepositors with the theory
in the Berry case. Under Section 6-103, the joint account, during the
lifetime of the depositors, belongs to each party to the extent of his
net contribution to the sum on deposit. 8 Since the depositor retains
full ownership rights over a sum equal to the amount of money he has
deposited less the amount of money he has withdrawn, there is no pres-
ent gift upon deposit. The rule in Schley would be superseded and the
present inconsistency between Schley and Berry would disappear.
The final draft of Article Six of the proposed code does not contain
a provision dealing with the division of an account when the parties
fail to prove net contributions. One of the reasons given for not attempt-
ing to cope with the problem was a concern that gift tax consequences
applicable to the creation of a tenancy in common might attach. With
regard to the Wisconsin gift tax, such a possibility seems minimal as
long as the rule in Berry remains the law. A provision declaring that
depositors will share equally when there is a lack of proof as to net
contributions would be only an alternative or secondary presumption.
Presently, proportionate ownership is the primary presumption and
there is no gift tax upon creation.
Wisconsin allows a yearly exemption from gift tax for any transfer
of property of the clear value of $1,000 by any donor to any donee.6 9
The Secretary of Revenue's Subcommittee on Taxation of Joint Ten-
ancy Property has proposed that the exemption be increased to $3,000
per year.7 0 The subcommittee considered the increase desirable for
several reasons, one of which was the fact that, under the proposed
amendment, a gift tax return would be required to prove that contribu-
tions to a joint account were intended as gifts to the codepositor. The
67271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d 767 (1955).
"Although under the statute she hereafter had the power to withdraw
said funds, she did not have the power or the right to appropriate and
thereby destroy her husband's interest therein. When she made such with-
drawals without the consent of her husband her acts severed the joint
tenancy but did not destroy her husband's joint and equal interest there-
in." For a more recent case coming to the same conclusion, see Estate of
Gray, 27 Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W.2d 816 (1965).68 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE Sec. 6-103 (a).
69 Wis. Stat. Sec 72.08(1).
7OLetter from Neil M. Conway to James R. Morgan, Secretary of Revenue,
January 20, 1970.
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most significant proposal by the subcommittee is to impose an inherit-
ance tax on certain types of property held in joint names (including
joint checking and savings accounts) to the full value of the property
less provable contributions. If gifts were made between codepositors,
such gifts would constitute provable contributions only if gift tax
returns were made, whether required or not by the standard exclusion.
The filing of a gift tax return would be a substitute for attempts to
prove donative intent at time of deposit. Under the proposed plan, the
gift tax return could become a more important tool in formulating an
estate plan.
FEDERAL GIFT TAX ON CREATION
Under both federal law 7'1 and Wisconsin law,"2 the gratuitous trans-
fer of property by an owner to himself and another as joint tenants is
considered a gift of one-half the value of the property given. Although
deposits into joint bank accounts would seem to be within the scope of
this general rule, the deposits receive special treatment under both
federal and state law.
Under federal tax law, deposits into joint bank accounts do not
give rise to a gift tax, apparently because of the ability of the depositor
to withdraw the amount deposited at will (assuming his co-depositor
has not done so). 7 ' The reasoning behind the federal tax treatment of
joint accounts is the same as that expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the Berry case. However, it must be remembered that, under
Wisconsin property law, the joint bank account is treated the same as
other property held in joint tenancy. Upon deposit, the donor depositor
has effectively given up ownership of one-half the deposit, and conse-
quently may not appropriate more than one-half the account.74
A distinction may be made, however, between the mere ability to
withdraw from a bank account and the right to appropriate, which is
withdrawal by one party for his private use with no intent to reim-
burse the account. For tax purposes, the courts are considering the
ability to withdraw when they conclude that a donor has not relin-
quished control over deposited funds. The ability to withdraw from a
joint account arises from the deposit contract with the bank. For pur-
poses of determining federal gift tax liability the federal law appears
to rely on the common law of gifts and where the depositor has the
right to withdraw the entire fund there will be no tax.
71 Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1 (h) (5) (1958).
72 Wis. Stat. Sec. 72.75.
, The example given is: "If A creates a joint bank account for himself and B
(or a similar type of ownership by which A can regain the entire fund with-
out B's consent) there is a gift to B when B draws upon the account for his
own benefit, to the extent of the amount drawn without any obligation to
account for a part of the proceeds to A."
,4 Estate of Kohn, 43 Wis. 2d 520, 168 N.W.2d 812 (1969).
[Vol. 53
COMMENT
The adoption of the rule in Section 6-103 leaving complete control
in the donor during his lifetime over his net contributions would seem
to do away with the necessity of recognizing a distinction between with-
drawal and appropriation. A depositor under Section 6-103 has the
right to appropriate his net contributions; this right gives him greater
control over his deposit than he now enjoys under Wisconsin case law.
The example given in Treasury Regulation 25.2511.1(h)(4) speaks
in terms of a form of ownership by which a depositor can regain the
entire fund without the codepositor's consent, which seems more like
the complete control which is retained under Section 6-103 than the
mere ability to withdraw presently permitted in Wisconsin.
Inclusion of the presumption of equal ownership in cases where
there is absence of proof as to net contributions would not seem to re-
sult in adverse federal gift tax consequences. Adoption of such a sec-
ondary presumption should not by itself alter the present policy of not
attempting to tax the creation of a joint bank account.
WISCONSIN INHERITANCE TAX
When a joint tenant dies, Wisconsin assesses an inheritance tax
against his interest in the property so owned as if he had owned the
property as a tenant in common with his co-owner or co-owners and
had devised or bequeathed his interests to the survivors' 5 Wisconsin
Statutes Section 72.01(6) specifically provides that joint bank accounts
are taxed at a fraction of their value as joint tenancies upon the death
of a depositor, 7 but questions arose when it could be shown that one
depositor in fact contributed all or more than his share of the deposit.
A claim by the survivor that he supplied all the funds on deposit in
joint names has been held immaterial; a taxable transfer of one-half
or other proper fraction is deemed to have occurred at the death of the
one dying first, even though he had never deposited any of his own
funds in the account. 77 In Estate of Simonson,7 8 the Court stated:
75 Wis Stat. Sec. 72.01(6) (1959).
76 Id. "Joint Interests. Whenever any property, real or personal, is held in the
joint names of two or more persons, or as tenants by the entirety, or is de-
posited in banks or other institutions or depositories in the joint names of
two or more persons and payable to either or the survivor, upon the death
of one of such persons the right of the surviving tenant by the entirety, joint
tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, to the immediate ownership or
possession and enjoyment of such property shall be deemed a transfer of
one-half or other proper fraction thereof taxable under the provisions of this
chapter in the same manner as though the property to which such transfer
relates belonged to the tenants by the entirety, joint tenants or joint depositors
as tenants in common, and had been bequeathed or devised to the surviving
tenant by the entirety, joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, by
such deceased tenant by the entirety, joint tenant or joint depositor, by will."
77 Estate of Hounsell, 252 Wis. 138, 31 N.W.2d 203 (1948) ; Estate of Atkinson,
261 Wis. 481, 53 N.W.2d 185 (1952). Both cases involved a husband and wifejoint bank account.
7811 Wis. 2d 84, 104 N.W.2d 134 (1960).
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Nothing in [Section 72.01(6)] suggests that its operation on
bank deposits in joint names is to be affected in any way by the
original ownership of the deposited funds. Sub. (6) quite clearly
provides for a tax upon the event of survivorship, and specifies
that survivorship shall be deemed a taxable transfer of one-half,
or other proper fraction of the amount on the deposit.
79
A claim by the state that the survivor supplied none of the funds is
also immaterial, and under Section 72.01(6) a taxable transfer of one-
half is deemed to have occurred. 0
The application of Section 72.01(6) to joint bank accounts has the
distinct advantage of simplicity of administration. A literal application
of the statute can be criticized because it results in double taxation of
one-half of the deposit if a surviving donor supplied all of the funds
and the donee predeceases the donor. When the donor dies first, Sec-
tion 72.01(6) fails to reach one-half of the sum deposited which also
has avoided a gift tax under the Berry case.
The Inheritance Tax Department, however, applies Section 72.01(6)
literally only when dealing with a husband and wife account. In all
other cases the department taxes the full amount of the account less
those contributions the survivor can prove he made."'
The Secretary of Revenue's Subcommittee on Taxation of Joint
Tenancy Property has suggested a revision of Section 72.01(6) which
property distinguishes between the true joint tenancy property and
"quasi" joint property such as joint bank accounts.8 2 The revision of
79 Id. at 88, 104 N.W.2d at 136.
so Id.
sl Letter from Patrick Lyons to James R. Morgan, Secretary of Revenue,
August 13, 1969.
"It is most difficult to ascertain the true interests of spouses as joint
tenants because of the common possession control and enjoyment of the
property. Where the facts relating to these points are clear and where
they establish the exclusion of one or the other spouse the property is
taxed according to the equities of the tenants. For practical purposes, how-
ever, we have made no effort to try to establish the exclusion of either
joint tenant as between spouses.
Where property is held jointly with other than a spouse these factors
are more easily established and we propose to tax the equities."
82 Proposed Wis. Stat. Sec. 72.01(6).
(a) Whenever any property, real or personal, is held in the joint names
of two or more persons, upon the death of one of such persons the right
of the surviving joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, to the
immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of such property shall
be a transfer of one-half or other proper fraction thereof taxable under
the provisions of this chapter in the same manner as though the property
to which such transfer relates belonged to said joint tenant or tenants,
person or persons as tenants in common and had been bequeathed or de-
vised to the surviving joint tenant or joint tenants, person or persons, by
such deceased joint tenant or person by will, except as set forth in sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection.
(b) Whenever any personal property is deposited in banks or other in-
stitutions in checking accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposit
or other similar forms of holding monies in the joint names of two or
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Section 72.01 (6) allows the tax department to tax the equities in the
"quasi" joint property and extends the treatment presently given prop-
erty held jointly by spouses to all real property held in joint tenancy.
Under the revised Section 72.01(6) (a) true joint tenancy property,
that which requires signatures of all joint tenants to transfer, shall be
taxable at one-half or other proper fraction based on the number of
joint tenants owning an interest in the property at the date of death
of the decedent. In the proposed subsections (b) and (c), "quasi" joint
tenancy property requiring signature of only one joint tenant to trans-
fer shall be taxable at full value except for offsets granted for provable
contributions or for gifts evidenced by the filing of gift tax returns,
whether or not such returns had been required.
The adoption of Section 6-103 of the Uniform Probate Code would
lend additional support for revising Section 72.01 (6). Once the pre-
more persons and payable to either or the survivor upon the death of one
or such persons, the right of the surviving person or persons to the im-
mediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of such property shall
be a transfer fully taxable under the provisions of this chapter, except
such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to the
survivor or survivors and never to have been received or acquired by
them from the decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth, in which case there shall be excepted only
such part as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by the sur-
vivor or survivors. Provided where said deposits have been acquired at
any time by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance by the decedent and any
other person or persons as joint tenants, the taxable portion shall be the
value of a fractional part of said property to be determined by dividing
the value of the property by the number of joint tenants. Provided further
that where a gift of a portion or all of said deposit has been made by
the decedent to the other person or persons who have said deposits in
their joint names with the decedent and a gift tax return filed, the value
of the gift shall be treated as adequate and full consideration by the
donee in determining the proportionate share to be expected from the
decedent's estate.
(c) Whenever any personal property, including but not limited to gov-
ernment obligations and brokerage street accounts, is held in joint names
of two or more persons and such property may be transferred during the
lifetime by any one of said persons to himself or to such other person
as he in his sole discretion desires upon his signature alone, upon the
death of one of such persons the right of the surviving person or persons
to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of such prop-
erty shall be a transfer fully taxable under the provisions of this chap-
ter, except such part therof as may be shown to have originally belonged
to the survivor or survivors and never to have been received or acquired
by them from the decedent for less than an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth, in which case there shall be excepted
only such part as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by the
survivor or survivors. Provided where said property has been acquired at
any time by gift, bequest, devise, or inheitance by the decedent and any
other person or persons as joint tenants, the taxable portion shall be the
value of the fractional part of said property to be determined by dividing
the value of the property by the number of joint tenants. Provided fur-
ther that where a gift of said property has been made by the decedent
to the other person or persons who have said property in their joint
names with the decedent and a gift tax return filed, the value of the gift
shall be treated as adequate and full consideration by the donee in deter-
mining the proportionate share to be excepted from the decedent's estate.
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sumption of a true joint tenancy is removed (a result Section 6-103
would accomplish), there is no reason for grouping joint bank accounts
with property held in true joint tenancy. Article 6 and the proposed
Section 72.01(6)(b) complement each other in their recognition of the
concept of net contributions. 83
The proposed Section 72.01 (6) (b) specifically affords recognition
of net contributions so long as they are provable. Of course, the burden
of proof is on the survivor to show his net contributions. In in inter
vivos dispute under Section 6-103, rights are also determined by net
contributions. Records kept by the parties are of prime importance
and parties might be persuaded to keep these records since they are so
essential for both tax and non-tax reasons.
In Estate of Simonson, 84 the state tried to close the loophole that
occurs when a donor depositor who has contributed more than half
of the amount in a joint account predeceases the donee depositor. As
noted earlier, no gift tax is assessed at the time of deposit because of
the donor's ability to withdraw. Under Section 72.01(6), only half
of the deposit is subject to inheritance tax. The state in Simonson con-
tended that the full amount of a joint deposit was subject to inheritance
tax under the provisions of Section 72.01 (3) (b) which taxes all trans-
fers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
death of the grantor."'
Mr. Simonson's estate included bank deposits and government
bonds valued at approximately a quarter of a million dollars which
were held in joint tenancy with his wife. Almost $100,000 of that
amount had been placed in joint tenancy within two years preceding
his death. The Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended
subsection (6) to preclude subsection (3) (b) from applying to joint
accounts.86 On the other hand, however, the court ruled that subsec-
83 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE Sec. 6-101(f) : "net contribution of a party to a joint
account as of any given time is the sum of all the deposits made by or for
him, less all withdrawals made by or for him which have not been paid to
or applied to the use of any other party, plus a pro rata share of any interest
or dividends included in the current balance."
s8 Note 66 supra.
85 Wis. Stat. Sec. 72.01(3) (b) (1959)
When a transfer is of property, made without an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth by a resident or by a nonresident
when such nonresident's property is within this state, or within its juris-
diction, by deed, grant, bargain, sale, or gift, intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor, vendor, or
donor, including any transfer where the transferor has retained for his
life or for any period not ending before his death: 1) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income, or to economic benefit from, the
property, or 2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate such transfer, or to designate the
beneficiary who shall possess or enjoy the property, or the income, or
the income, or economic benefit therefrom.
86 1 Wis. 2d at 88, 104 N.W.2d at 136.
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tion (3) (a)8 7 applied to those deposits made within two years of
Simonson's death.8
The Court in coming to the decision that subsection (3)(b) does
not apply to joint bank accounts limited its ruling to a joint bank
account established "with the intention that each should have the right
to withdraw at will before or after the death of the other."' 9 After
recognizing the possibility of an account of convenience or an agency
account and that in cases not involving tax issues intention of the
depositor is important, the Court held:
Whether sub. (3)(b), rather than sub. (6) would apply to a
bank deposit by a decedent in the names of himself and another
where the other was unaware of his apparent right to withdraw
or where the other bound himself not to withdraw during the
life of the decedent need not be decided in this case.90
The Court evidently was speaking of an account like that in the
Michaels case9' where the donee had no knowledge of the joint
account. The survivorship feature of the account was given effect in
that case. Article 6 could be said to create an account somewhat similar
to a Michaels' account. Present ownership is presumed to remain in
the donor but survivorship is presumed to be intended and is given
effect. Possibly the Department of Revenue would have support for
applying subsection (3) (b) to an Article 6 multiple party account
in the language quoted above from Simonson.
The proposed revision of Section 72.01(6) allows inclusion of the
full amount of the account into the decedent's estate subject to proof
of contributions by the survivor or filing of gift tax returns. Since
the same result would be reached under the proposed Section 72.01(6)
(b) as that allowed under application of subsection (3) (b), the inheri-
tance tax department would have little reason to use subsection (3) (b).
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
The federal estate tax applies only to estates of more than $60,0009-
and joint interests expressly qualify for marital deduction93 so that a
87 Wis. Stat. Sec. 72.01(3) (a) (1959) :
When the transfer is of property, made by a resident or by a non-resident
when such nonresident's property is within the state, or within its jurisdic-
tion, by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift, made in contemplation of the
death of the grantor, vendor, or donor. Every transfer by deed, grant,
bargain, sale or gift, made within 2 years prior to the death of the grantor,
vendor, or donor, of a material pat of his estate, or in the nature of a
final disposition or distribution thereof, and without an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, shall, unless shown to the con-
trary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of this section.
88 11 Wis. 2d at 92, 104 N.W.2d at 138.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Estate of Michaels, 23 Wis. 2d 382, 132 N.W.2d 557 (1965).9 2 
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2052.
9 3
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2052.
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joint bank account between husband and wife will pose federal estate
tax problems only where the estate exceeds $120,000.
The Internal Revenue Code requires inclusion as part of the
decedent's estate of ". . . the value of all property held as joint tenant
by the decedent and any any other person . . . or deposited . . . in
their joint names and payable to either or the survivor, except such
part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such
other person and never to have been received or acquired by the latter
from the decedent" as a giftY4 Consequently, the joint bank account
may be included in the decedent's estate at any amount ranging from
the total deposit to nothing. However, Section 2040 of the Internal
Revenue Code places on the taxpayer the burden of showing the extent
to which the survivor contributed all or part of the joint account.95
The circumstances of each fact situation determine the kinds of evi-
dence which would show the survivor's contribution. The position of
Section 6-103 of the Uniform Probate Code compliments Section
2040 of the Internal Revenue Code. If Section 6-103 were the law,
each party would have a greater incentive to keep adequate records
and to retain evidence of ownership rights in a joint account. The
same kinds of evidence showing the net contributions of each party
could be used to resolve disputes between living codepositors, to deter-
mine amounts transferred for inheritance tax purposes, and to deter-
mine federal estate tax pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section
2040.
SUMMARY
The application of traditional property concepts to joint bank
accounts is susceptible to criticism. There is little question that the
joint account is not a true joint tenancy. Survivorship rights and
lifetime rights should be treated separately if separate treatment is
needed to give full effect to the intention of the parties. The rules
found in Article Six of the Uniform Probate Code seem to be an im-
provement over the present law in Wisconsin. Section 6-103 creates
a presumption that is closer to and protects the actual intention of the
parties. The concept of net contributions poses some practical problems
of administration but with additional rules providing for situations
where there is complete or partial failure of proof as to net contribu-
tion, this problem could be alleviated. In the area of taxation, Article
Six's position on inter vivos rights does not cause any serious problems
94 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2040.
95 Treas. Reg. 3040-1 (a) (2) (1958) provides:
The entire value of jointly held property is included in a decedent's gross
estate unless the executor submits facts sufficient to show that property
was not acquired entirely with consideration furnished by the decedent,
or was acquired by the decedent and the other joint owner or owners by
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.
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and the changes that would result from the Article's adoption seem to
be desirable. In the final analysis, it would appear that uniform rules
modeled upon those of the Article Six would be an improvement over
the present Wisconsin position.
GERARD J. O'FLAHERTY
